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Abstract 
 
Purpose 
Drawing on motivation theory and family business literature, we investigate the 
influence of family effect in growth behavior of small-and-medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in the UK.  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
We first compare the actual and expected growth of family and non-family-
owned SMEs. We then compare the growth behaviour of small family firms 
managed by owner-directors and small family businesses co-managed by 
family and non-family directors with the non-family-owned SMEs.  
 
Findings 
We find a negative effect of family ownership on actual and intended small 
business growth behaviors. In addition, our findings also suggest that small 
family firms co-managed by non-family and family directors are no different 
from non-family owned firms, in terms of reporting past actual growth in 
employment size and turnover as well as expecting growth in workforce size 
and turnover. We also observe a significant difference in anticipating sales 
growth between family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms. However, 
this difference is not explained by the heterogeneity of a top management team. 
 
Practical implications 
The study has important implications for managerial practice to family firms 
and on policies that improve the growth of SMEs. Specifically, the competence 
of managers and decision-makers matters considerably in evaluating the 
efficient operation of the business and maximising economic growth in SMEs. 
 
Originality/value 
The study makes two important theoretical contributions to small business 
growth literature. Firstly, our findings underline a negative family effect in the 
actual and expected growth behaviour of SMEs. Secondly, the mode of family 
ownership alone may not sufficiently capture family effect and offer a thorough 
understanding of growth behaviour in SMEs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a long but limited tradition of literature that contributes to the understanding of the 
relationship between family ownership and small business growth (Daily and Dollinger, 
1992; Daily and Thompson, 1994; Maherault, 2000; Gallo et al., 2004; Rutherford et al., 
2006; Oswald et al., 2009; Hamelin, 2013). Generally, the relationship is characterised as 
being starkly polarised in the family business literature (Nordqvist et al., 2008). On one hand, 
the stewardship perspective supports a positive effect of family ownership on growth as the 
owners and managers of family businesses act as the stewards to ensure the continuity or 
longevity of the enterprise and its mission (Miller et al., 2008). On the other hand, the 
stagnation perspective portrays a more negative picture of family businesses, arguing that its 
difficulties in growth and survival are attributed to resource restrictions (Chandler, 1990; 
Grassby, 2000), conservative strategies (Poza et al., 1997, Allio, 2004), and family conflicts 
such as succession difficulties (Jehn, 1997; Schulze et al., 2003). The scarce empirical 
evidence, however, has been inconclusive with negative (Hamelin, 2013; Oswald et al., 2009; 
Rutherford et al., 2006) as well as insignificant relationships being reported (Gallo et al., 
2004; Daily and Thompson, 1994). This line of research has exclusively investigated the 
ownership dimension of family effect on small firm growth, disregarding the allocation of 
decision rights or governance structure.  
A group of authors suggests that growth of a small business is at least partially 
determined by the entrepreneur or manager’s motivations and intentions for expanding the 
business (Davidsson, 1991; Baum et al., 2001; Davidsson et al., 2002; Wiklund et al., 2003; 
Delmar and Wiklund, 2008). This argument is supported by the psychological construct of 
motivation theory which states that growth is an important outcome of entrepreneurial efforts 
which are closely linked to the individual’s motivation (Davidsson et al., 2002). Specifically, 
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small business managers’ beliefs, in relation to the consequence of growth, shape their overall 
growth attitudes and motivations towards expanding the business (Wiklund et al., 2003). The 
proposition has important growth implications for small family businesses, as one 
distinguishing characteristic of such firms is that the owners and managers are often one and 
the same, i.e. members of the founder and/or owner family maintain a hands-on presence in 
the daily management of the company. The family business literature has long argued that the 
role of family as an emotional system has a strong influence on a given individual’s 
development and values (Stein, 1985; Bernal and Ysern, 1986). More recently, drawing upon 
behavioural agency theory, the increasingly used perspective of socioemotional wealth in 
family firms posits that family-CEOs are motivated by non-family socioemotional wealth 
objectives rather than economic and financial performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2011).   
Yet, a large majority of existing studies use family ownership as a primary proxy 
variable to investigate the family effect on actual and intended business growth, whereas the 
family effect of owner-management concentration on small firm growth remains invisible. 
Hence, the purpose of the present study is to close the gap by exploring the combined effect 
of family ownership and involvement on small firm
1
 growth. Following the prior work (e.g. 
Miller et al., 2014; Chittoor and Das, 2007), we group SMEs into three categories: 1) non-
family owned firms that are presumably run by externally sourced professional managing 
directors, 2) family firms run by directors who are owning family-members, and 3) family 
firms which are managed by professional managing directors along with co-directors who are 
family members. Here, professional managing directors are equated with external, non-
family, non-owner managers who are expected to bring in ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ to the 
                                               
1 In the present study, small businesses refer to firms with less than 250 employees, i.e. small-and-
medium sized enterprises (SMEs).   
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family firms (Chittoor and Das, 2007; Gersick et al., 1997). Three growth indicators (sales, 
employment and turnover) are gathered from the first wave of UK Longitudinal Small 
Business Survey (SBS 2015), to proxy the three incidence of growth.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the primary 
theoretical framework (i.e. motivation theory and family business literature) and empirical 
evidence. Section three describes the data and defines the variables. Section four presents the 
results. Section five discusses the findings and concludes the paper. The final section provides 
some implications for future research and managerial practice.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DERIVATION 
2.1 Measuring growth  
The intention to perform a certain behaviour (in this case, growth intention) can be driven by 
various factors, some of which are endogenous or internal (e.g. needs, values, habits and 
beliefs: see Lee and Wong, 2004) whereas others are exogenous or situational (e.g. difficulty 
or complexity of the task). In our study, the specific behaviour that is of interest is firm 
growth. The latter is considered a multi-dimensional phenomenon featured with great 
heterogeneity (Delmar et al., 2003). Generally, growth can either denote merely increase in 
amount, such as growth in output, sales or export, or imply an increase in size or 
improvement in quality resulting from a process of development (Penrose, 1959). From the 
change-in-amount perspective, growth can be operationalised using a range of different 
indicators, such as sales, employment, asset, turnover and profit (Weinzimmer et al., 1998; 
Wiklund, 1998). Davidsson et al. (2002) conclude that growth is best assessed as size changes 
over multiple periods using a concurrent and longitudinal design, and suggest that sales 
 5 
 
growth is the most desirable measure. By contrast, entrepreneurship scholars, taking the 
process of development perspective, argue that entrepreneurial owner-managers are more 
driven by growth as development through various forms such as vertical integration, 
diversification, licensing, alliance or joint ventures (Delmar et al., 2003). In this sense, sales 
growth is considered a consequence rather than a goal. Our analysis of growth intention in 
SMEs applies the change-in-amount approach by utilising three perceptual indicators: growth 
in employment size, growth in turnover, and growth in sales. The choice of the growth 
measures is largely influenced by the information available in our dataset. This approach has 
been evidenced theoretically and empirically. For example, using transaction cost theory, 
Chandler et al. (2005) explain when growth in sales and employment do and do not move 
closely together. 
 
2.2 The growth behaviour of SMEs: the role of owner-management structure: family effects 
Motivation theories provide the theoretical underpinnings of why people behave in a certain 
manner. One of the principal concepts in motivation theories is attitudes. An attitude pertains 
to the valuation of an object or a concept, i.e. the degree to which an object or concept is 
judged as good or bad (Wiklund et al., 2003). One of the dominant theoretical frameworks in 
the belief-attitude-behaviour literature is the expectancy-value theory of attitude (Ajzen, 
1991), which is developed to predict specific attitudes in specific context (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980). According to this theory, an individual’s attitude towards a specific 
behaviour (e.g. firm growth) is a function of the salient beliefs that he or she holds about 
eliciting the behaviour. Beliefs associate an object with certain attributes (Wiklund et al., 
2003). In the case of behavioural beliefs, the object is the behaviour of interest and the 
associated attributes are the expected results of that behaviour, which can be liked or disliked 
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by the person. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) stress that the beliefs must correspond to the 
specific behaviour in relation to action, target, context and time in order to permit 
understanding and prediction of the attitude. In order to predict a small business manager’s 
behavioural intention of expanding the business to a certain extent, for example, it is of 
significant importance to evaluate the beliefs of the possible consequences of undertaking 
such behaviour. As indicated by the expectancy-value theory of attitudes, a plausible reason 
as to why a small business manager has a great propensity to limit growth is that he/she 
anticipates some negative consequences of business growth. Alternatively, a small firm 
manager is more likely to pursue growth strategy if the growth is expected to bring about 
positive consequences.  
Wiklund et al. (2003) suggest that the growth-related attitudes and behaviours 
exhibited by small business managers are shaped by the assessment of the relative importance 
of economic (e.g. financial outcomes) and non-economic motives (e.g. employee well-being). 
This line of research is consistent with the growing popularity of socioemotional wealth 
perspective of family owned and managed firms that owner-managers and family-directors 
are more concerned about non-financial objectives of the family businesses, such as 
preserving family controls (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2011). Based on a comprehensive 
classical work on small business management and motivation (Smith, 1967; Bolton, 1971; 
Boswell, 1972; Stanworth and Curran, 1973; Deeks, 1976), Wiklund and his colleagues 
propose eight core areas that can affect small business managers’ salient beliefs about growth, 
including owner-manager’s workload, work tasks, employee well-being, personal income, 
control, independence, survival ability and product/service quality. Among them, we argue 
that expected consequences of growth in relation to control, independence and survival ability 
are consistent with family-oriented values (i.e. tradition, stability, loyalty, trust and 
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interdependency) as proposed by Lumpkin et al (2008). Particularly, the survival ability is 
closely linked to the concept of stability, which emphasizes the sense of permanence and 
security that family businesses can provide. It is self-evident that the owner-managers’ need 
for control and independence relates to loyalty and interdependency, because these two 
aspects of family orientation refer to the degree to which family members are committed to 
each other and support one another emotionally (e.g. share jobs, triumphs and sorrows) and 
physically (e.g. sharing resource and money). Together, they provide a useful conceptual 
framework to understand the difference in growth-related attitudes between owner-managers 
and professional managers in small family firms. In the following section, we consider how 
possible consequences of business expansion may be shaped by the small family owner-
managers’ beliefs with regards to family orientation and attitudes towards growth. Insofar, 
there are two mainstream but opposing perspectives pertaining to the influence of family 
effect on SMEs’ actual and intended growth behaviour: stagnation versus stewards’ 
perspectives.  
The ‘stagnation perspective’ advocates a negative picture of involving owning family 
members in the management team, and argues that family firms represent an inferior and 
largely dysfunctional form of organisation thus, subject to a number of critical weaknesses 
(Miller et al., 2008). The stagnation literature proposes several motives behind family owned 
firms adopting peculiar and conservative growth behavior. Firstly, among all firm-level 
resources, capital structure may have the most pronounced impact on SMEs pursuing further 
development and expansion (Rutherford et al., 2006). In comparison with externally sourced 
managers, owner-managers of family businesses are more likely to eschew external financing 
and rely on internal financing in order to avoid equity diversification and maintain control 
(Chandler, 1990; Grassby, 2000). For many family business owners, maintaining business 
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ownership, independence and family control are top business priorities (Kotkin, 1984; 
Neubauer and Lank, 1998). In addition to this, the owner-manager’s need for autonomy is 
also related to family altruism (i.e. loyalty and interdependence), that firm-level resources are 
shared or demanded by other family owners, members and managers. For instance, parents 
behave altruistically towards their offsprings, in terms of using company resources to offer 
investments and/or to provide employment opportunities to their children who possess little or 
inadequate amounts of knowledge, skills and abilities (Schulze et al., 2003; Lubatkin, 2007). 
Owner-managers have a strong desire for control, and it is their quest to be more inclusive in 
their management styles and decision-making processes. Taking additional loans and sharing 
equity may be precisely the perquisite for achieving growth, however, this may be at the 
expense of losing independence and control in relation to lenders (Wiklund et al., 2003). As a 
result, owner-managers are restricted to taking decisions in their own interest and to 
allocating the company resource freely (Molly et al., 2010). These negative consequences of 
growth undermine owner-managers’ beliefs and feelings of autonomy, and thus lead to a 
negative attitude towards growth. 
Secondly, the firm’s survival ability associated with increased size is another expected 
consequence of growth that affects a small business manager’s attitude towards expansion. 
Small family firm owners are said to be deeply concerned about the survival, stability and 
long-term prospects of the business, as a significant amount of family fortune, reputation and 
future are at stake (Miller et al., 2008). In this sense, the high risk of failure (Morris, 1998) 
and the potential destruction family wealth (Sharma et al., 1997) may impede owner-
managers’ intention to engage in risky business expansion activities and thus growth 
ambitions and opportunities (Poza et al., 1997; Allio, 2004). According to behavioural agency 
theory, owner-managers of family firms may avoid intelligent business risks to preserve the 
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socioemotional wealth of family members (e.g. keep family control of the firm, avoid risk), 
and in doing so they may sacrifice economic performance (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2011; 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and their personal interest such as financial income and 
other disposable economic benefits (Ashwin et al., 2015). By contrast, the agency theorists 
posit that the separation of ownership and management requires principals (i.e. shareholders 
or owners) and control agents (i.e. managers) either by direct monitoring and supervision or 
through use of monetary incentives that align the interests of both the agent and principals 
(Greenwood, 2003). The latter mechanism indicates that non-family managers are more prone 
to opportunistic behaviours and are more risk-tolerant, because financial performance of the 
firm is closely linked to their monetary rewards.  
 Thirdly, the possibility of increased conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders in relation to business expansion is another determinant of owner-managers’ 
attitudes towards growth. Given that divergent groups of shareholders may pursue competing 
goals in pursuit of growth, family-owned firms provide fertile grounds for relationship 
conflicts (Miller and Rice, 1988; Boles, 1996). For instance, conflicts may emerge as a 
consequence of discrepancies between financial (e.g. increasing sales) and non-financial goals 
(e.g. secure family employment), or disparities between family (e.g. maintaining family 
control over the business) and business objectives (e.g. global market or international 
expansion). In other words, growth may lead to conflicts among the members of family 
shareholders, which can jeopardise the survival of the firm and hamper the optimal 
functioning of the family business (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2007; 2004; Jehn, 1997). 
These expected negative concerns of expansion in relation to survivability and permanence of 
family businesses may lead to a more negative owner-manager’s attitude towards growth. 
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The opposing view that propose a much more positive picture of the relationship 
between family effects and growth behaviours of SMEs has been voiced in stewardship 
perspective. According to stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997), the stewardship of family 
owners and managers originates from their socio-emotional attachment to the firm, which can 
be significantly high, because the firm can serve the needs of security, social contribution, 
belonging and family standing (Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Gomez Mejia et al., 2007; 
Langsberg, 1999). The stewardship of family business leaders is deeply embodied in the 
continuity or longevity of the enterprise and its mission. In managing the family business, 
family executives and managers serve as socially embedded enablers of both the company 
and the family through securing the long-term benefit of various family members (Miller et 
al., 2008; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  
Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005) suggest that stewardship over the continuity can 
be manifested in three forms of business-growing activities. Firstly, family firms tend to 
emphasize more on introducing new offerings through investing in new products 
technologies. A group of scholars suggest that family businesses are concerned not so much 
with quarterly earning but the long run continuity of the enterprise through investing for the 
long run in developing new products and technologies (James, 2006; Weber et al., 2003; 
Gallo and Vilaseca, 1996). Secondly, family firms are more likely to stress on their reputation 
in the market as a resource to achieve long-term robustness of the business (Eddleston and 
Kellermanns, 2007; Barney, 1991), in terms of improving their existing customers’ loyalties 
and attracting new clients. Thirdly, investments into the continuity of the family firm are 
geared towards the broadening of the market boundaries, such as penetrating into the existing 
markets or expanding into new ones (Miller et al., 2008). Hence, stewardship over continuity 
stems from the intention of passing the family firm to succeeding generations and ensuring 
 11 
 
the long-survival and prosperity of the firm. Such orientation inspires owners and managers to 
exploit entrepreneurship opportunities and actively engage in growth strategies and 
entrepreneurial ventures in family-owned SMEs.  
Empirical studies that have examined the effects of family involvement (i.e. family 
ownership, and owner-management structure) on growth have produced mixed results. With 
respect to the individual effect of family ownership, the findings of the studies by Gallo et 
al.’s (2004) and Daily and Dollinger’s (1992) suggest that family ownership is statistically 
insignificantly related to business. Others (e.g. Hamelin, 2013; Oswald et al., 2009; 
Rutherford et al., 2006) observe a negative relationship between ownership structure and 
small business growth behaviours, lending support to the stagnation perspective. Evidence 
suggests that the positive impact of family ownership on growth is relatively rare. On the 
other hand, empirical research which focuses on the owner-management structure on SME’s 
growth behaviour has been largely scant. Where it is available, inconclusive results also have 
been reported.  For instance, Barth et al. (2005) examine the role of owner-management on 
the productivity in 438 Norwegian establishments with more than 10 employees, and find that 
family firms managed by a person hired outside the owner family are equally productive as 
non-family-owned firms, whereas family businesses managed by a person from the owner 
family are significantly less. Their findings sustain even after controlling the endogeneity of 
management regime. On the other hand, in a study of 409 US manufacturing firms, Zahra 
(2003) explores the family effects on firm growth as operationalised by international 
expansion, and finds that a positive effect of owner-management structure  on 
internationalisation of a firm’s operation.  
To sum up, the literature examines the influence of family effect (e.g. family 
ownership, and owner-management structure) on SMEs growth behaviours and has generated 
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a rather ambiguous picture, where positive, negative and nonsignificant relationships all seem 
to be valid somehow. Hence, no a priori relationship is posited in the present study. Instead, 
we propose to investigate the following two important research questions adding more recent 
evidence into the debate:  
Research question 1: Does family ownership affect actual and intended growth of 
SMEs? 
Research question 2: Does owner-management structure explain differences in 
growth patterns between family and non-family-owned SMEs?  
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Data 
The Small Business Survey (SBS) 2015 is a nationally represented employer dataset in the 
UK, which is based on a stratified sample of SMEs that employ up to 249 people, inclusive of 
those with no employees. The survey is the latest in series of annual and biennial Small 
Business Surveys (SBS) dating back to 2003,
2
 and the first wave of the Longitudinal Small 
Business Surveys (LSBS) which were commissioned by the Department for Business, 
Innovation & Skills (BIS). It is a large-scale telephone survey of 15,502 UK small business 
owners and managers, comprising of 13,620 from IDBR (n=72,388; response rate =18.8%) 
and 1,882 from Dun and Bradstreet (n=21,481; response rate=8.8%)
3
. The respondents of the 
                                               
2
 Due to changes to questions asked and the sampling methodology, data collected from Small Business Survey 
2015 cannot always be compared with previous SBSs.  
3
 Firms extracted from IDBR are VAT registered or had employees; whereas Dun and Bradstreet contains 
sampled firms with unregistered zero employees non-VAT paying businesses that are not included in the IDBR. 
  
 13 
 
survey are owners and managers who are some of the most senior people in day-to-day 
control of the businesses. The survey provides useful insights into a range of issues in UK 
small organizations, including business performance, growth and success, business network 
and innovation, financial issues and the use of business support and recruitment and training 
aspects.  
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
Given the availability of information in SBS2015 dataset, we were able to include and analyse 
three growth indicators (i.e. turnover, employment and sales) separately. The first one is 
Growth in employment size: Managerial respondents were asked to indicate whether the 
number of employees on the payroll increased in the 12 months or is expected to increase in 
the 12 months after, score 1 if ‘more than currently’; otherwise 0. The second one is Growth 
in turnover: Managerial respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which the turnover 
of business grew in the 12 months before or is expected to grow in the 12 months after, 
measured on a seven-point scale (0, ‘no or shrinkage’; 1, ‘0-4%’; 2, ‘5-9%’; 3, ‘10-14%’; 4, 
‘15-19%’, 5, ‘20-29%’; or  6, ‘30%+’).  Our third measure of growth is Growth in sales: 
Measured by the percentage the SME aim to grow sales in 3 years’ time, measured on a 
seven-point scale (0, ‘no’; 1, ‘1-9%’; 2, ’10-24%’; 3, ’25-49%’; 4, ’50-74%’; 5, ’75-99%’; or 
6, ‘100% or more’).  
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3.3. Family effect: family ownership and owner-management structure  
Family ownership is measured based on one item (Q1): ‘Is your business a family owned 
business, that is one which is majority owned by members of the same family?’. The response 
is evaluated on a binary scale: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In addition, a second item (Q2) – ‘Does your 
business have any directors in day-to-day control of your business who are not owners or 
partners?’ allows us to construct the owner-management structure variable. To this end, we 
grouped SMEs into three categories: 1) non-family owned business if the response to Q1 is 
‘no’; 2) family business run by owner-managers only if Q1 score ‘yes’ and Q2 score ‘no’; and 
3) family business that have non-family managers in daily control of the business if Q1 and 
Q2 both score ‘yes’.  
  
3.3. Control variables  
In line with prior research (e.g. Olson et al., 2003; Barth et al., 2005; Sciascia et al., 2012), 
we control for firm size, age, types of industry, legal status, geographical locations, presence 
of working owners/partners, number of sites in operation, and firm capability (see Appendix 
A1). Firm size is measured by the number of employees currently on the payroll. Firm age is 
constructed by the number of years the firm had been trading. Industry type is coded into 14 
different categories based on UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007. Legal status 
is summarized into four types: sole proprietorship, company, partnership and other. 
Geographical location is derived based on the region or state (i.e. England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland) where the business is located. The working owners/partners work in the 
business is measured by whether they are present or not. The number of sites is constructed 
by the log of the number of sites in operation including the head office in the UK. Firm 
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capability is constructed by a composite score of capabilities for people management, 
developing and implementing a business plan and strategy, developing and introducing new 
products or services, accessing external finance and operation management (Cronbach's alpha 
=0.74).  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1 Analytical techniques 
To examine empirically the relationship between family ownership and management 
involvement on growth in SMEs, we estimate probit (i.e. growth in employment size) and 
ordered probit regressions (i.e. growth in turnover and sales), while controlling for a range of 
firm characteristics. Though both coefficient and marginal effects of probit and ordered probit 
estimations are reported, our analysis is primarily drawn on estimation results of marginal 
effects because both modelling are concerned with how changes in the predictors translate 
into the probability of observing a particular outcome (for further discussion see Wooldridge, 
2009).  
 
4.2 The effect of family ownership on growth 
To address our first research question, we examine the effect of family ownership on SMEs 
growth on employment size, turnover and sales. The probit estimation results for the influence 
of the family ownership in relation to growth in workforce size are presented in Table 1. The 
results suggest that the probability that a family business reported an actual growth in 
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employment size during the 12 months before is significantly lower than the non-family-
controlled business and so is the expected growth in workforce size for the 12 months after. 
The ordered probit estimation outcomes for growth in turnover and sales are shown in Table 
2. We observe that the family firms not only are less likely than the non-family-owned 
businesses to experience an increase in turnover during the year before, but also less likely to 
expect an increase in turnover in the year after and sales for the three years after. In line with 
prior studies (e.g. Hamelin, 2013; Maherault, 2000), our findings support a statistically 
significant and negative effect of family ownership on small business growth.  
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
4.3 The effect of owner-management structure on SMEs’ growth  
We now turn our interest to the second research question. The probit estimation results for 
growth in employment size are presented in Table 3. Owner-management structure has a 
negative effect on the growth of SMEs. Specifically, family firms with owner-managers 
involved in the day to day control of the business is 5.1 percentage points less likely to 
experience an increase in workforce size the 12 months before than non-family-owned 
managers (Panel A), and 3 percentage points less likely to expect increased employment size 
in the 12 months after (Panel B). However, there is no significant difference in growth 
behaviours between family firms which appoints externally sourced directors and non-family-
owned businesses.  
[Table 3 about here] 
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 The ordered probit estimation outcomes for growth in turnover and sales are shown in 
Table 4. The influence of owner-management structure on actual and expected growth in 
turnover is negative. More specifically, the possibility that a family firm ran by owner-
managers only experienced growth in turnover during the year before is significantly lower 
than non-family-owned firms, regardless of the percentage of growth rate (Panel A). The 
actual growth patterns of family businesses with external managing directors involved in 
daily control of the businesses do not differ significantly from that of non-family-owned 
firms. These results also apply to expected growth in turnover (Panel B). Panel C shows the 
coefficient and marginal effect results in relation to expected growth in sales in the three years 
after. Overall, the results suggest that family firms are less likely to expect a boost in sales 
than non-family-controlled firms, regardless of the composition of the management team. In 
other words, there is a significant difference in anticipating sales growth between family and 
non-family-owned organisations, however, the difference is not explained by management 
regime.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Research on the impact of family effect on small firm performance has emerged since the 
early 1990s. However, studies that investigate the influence of family effect on small business 
growth remain relatively scarce (Hamelin, 2013), with a large majority of research devoted to 
the effect of family ownership and overlooking the family effect of management structure in 
business expansion. Drawing on motivation theory and family business literature, we 
investigate the family effect on SME’s actual and intended growth captured by three growth 
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indicators, i.e. employment size, turnover and sales. We first examine the relationship 
between family ownership and growth behavior of SMEs, and secondly we compare the 
business growth of family firms managed by family directors, family firms co-managed by 
non-family and family directors with non-family-owned firms managed by externally sourced 
directors.  
Supporting evidence reported in prior studies (e.g. Hamelin, 2013; Oswald et al., 
2000; Rutherford et al., 2006), we find a negative relationship between family ownership and 
actual and expected growth in employment size, turnover and sales, suggesting that family 
SMEs are not only less likely to experience growth during the past 12 months but also less 
likely to grow business in the coming year(s). Furthermore, our findings suggest that this 
growth variation can be explained by the difference in composition of the top management 
team. That is, family firms that have both externally sourced professional directors and 
family-directors are no different from non-family-owned firms, in terms of reporting actual 
growth in workforce size and turnover for the past year and anticipating growth in the next 12 
months. It can be argued, for example, that non-family managers and directors may contribute 
to positive growth of small family businesses, both by bringing a set of management ability, 
skills and knowledge and by reducing the disruptive potential of a family socioemotional 
agenda (Blumentritt et al., 2007; Klein and Bell, 2007; Miller et al., 2013). These findings 
collaborate with evidence of the recent study by Chang and Shim (2015) who further went on 
to state that the growth strategies are even more active, once the professional managers are 
graduates of elite universities, because they did not have to contend with any legacies of the 
family even though they keep their high ownership controls. One potential explanation of 
these results, albeit tentative, is that small organizations with same individual(s) from owner 
family of the business dominating both ownership and management of the firm and who are 
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highly family-oriented have a strong desire of passing the business to succeeding generations 
(James, 1999) and allowing key business decisions to be shaped by the family (Chua et al., 
1999). Another plausible explanation as to why small firms with the presence of external, 
non-owner, non-family managers and directors in the top management team are more likely to 
report actual and expected growth, lies in the tenets of agency theory. The separation of 
ownership and management requires the appropriate incentive mechanisms, usually in the 
form of financial incentive, linking the leader work performance to the economic and 
financial performance of the firm (Greenwood, 2003). In this sense, non-family directors and 
managers have a stronger tendency to engage in entrepreneurial and risk-taking opportunities 
to not only maximise their financial incomes but also to build up good managerial reputation.   
The expectancy-value theory of attitude (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) postulates that an 
individual’s attitude towards a certain behaviour is a function of the salient beliefs that he or 
she holds about the behaviour. In the context of family businesses, we argue that owner-
managers’ beliefs and attitudes towards growth are deeply affected and shaped by their 
special dynamic from the influence of family on business (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008). 
Particularly, family managers and directors are more prone to embrace socioemotional wealth 
and goals including maintaining control of the firm, hiring family managers and exhibiting 
altruistic behaviour than external, non-owner, non-family directors who have no significant 
financial stake and kinship ties attached to the business (Miller et al., 2014). By contrast, the 
latter managers and directors are more likely to be incentivised to pursue growth opportunities 
and maximize the efficiency of the operation, because their reputation, personal needs, 
satisfaction and benefits are closely linked to performance and success of the business. Rather 
interestingly, Feldman et al. (2013) argue that family owned businesses will venture into a 
growth opportunity only if it is greater than the value it creates for non–family owned 
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businesses as they have other operational motives rather than building up share values. For 
instance, as Wennberg et al. (2011) point out that if the intention of the family owners is to 
pass on to the next generation, then they would be very risk adverse in prioritizing long term 
stability and survival over growth.  
Nicholson (2008) points out that the negative flip side of family firms in relation to the 
issues of principal-principal agency can lead to conservative growth strategies with respect to 
preservations of their undiversified portfolios. As noted by Desender et al. (2013), “Family 
control represents a distinctive class of investors in that they hold undiversified portfolios…” 
(p14). López-Delgado and Diéguez-Soto (2015) suggest that any type of owner concentrated 
business will always outperform one that is owner dispersed. Specifically, the lone family 
owned business will outperform one that is owned by more than one family owner. 
Essentially, with dispersed ownership there are agency costs which undermine the actual and 
intended growth, whereas with any owner concentrated business there is stewardship where 
the agents become role holders. On the other hand, the literature on entrepreneurial 
orientation in family firms argues that family businesses are not necessarily risk-averse, rather 
they are inherently more entrepreneurial and innovative, because they are founded on 
innovativeness and they need to keep the founding entrepreneurial spirits of the organization 
alive (Hamel, 2007). The findings of S&P 500 firms (Short et al., 2009) confirm the existence 
of an entrepreneurial orientation in family firms which exhibit language, and embrace all 
dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation.   
On the other hand, we find that family firms are significantly less likely than non-
family-controlled firms to plan an increase in sales over the three years after. One plausible 
explanation of this result is that the degree of power that family directors over externally 
appointed professional managing directors is too large. Sciascia et al. (2012) suggest that 
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growth aspirations may be actually maximized when the degree of family involvement in the 
top management team is at best moderate. Similarly, findings of 893 Italian family firms 
(Miller et al., 2014) demonstrate that non-family leaders outperform when they are not 
required to share power with co-CEOs who are family members. Given that a substantial 
proportion of family wealth and fortune is invested in family businesses, small family 
managers are increasingly cautious about exploring opportunities to expand businesses. As a 
result, conservative growth policies are more likely to be preferred over the longer horizon.  
 
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY, FUTURE RESEARCH AND PRACTICE  
The study makes two important theoretical contributions to small business growth literature. 
Firstly, overall our findings underline a negative family effect (i.e. owner-management 
structure) in the actual and expected growth behaviour of SMEs. The results lend empirical 
support to a potential interaction of applying and collaborating motivation theory and family 
business literature in understanding small business managers’ beliefs of and attitudes towards 
growth. It seems that growth of SMEs is driven by motivation rather than value maximisation 
(Cassar, 2007; Delmar and Wilklund, 2008). The motivation behind the conservative growth 
behaviour may be tentatively illustrated by favouring family socioemotional wealth versus 
economic performance (Berrone et al., 2010; 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2011), which 
play a critical role in influencing small family owner-managers’ psychological values, beliefs 
and attitudes towards expanding businesses. Secondly, the mode of family ownership alone 
may not sufficiently capture family effect and offer a thorough understanding of growth 
behaviour in SMEs. The study therefore, provides empirical support to the line of research 
that the growth pattern of an SME is also associated with heterogeneity of top management 
team (Hart, 2001; Hambrick et al., 1996). Using the combined effect of family ownership 
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plus owner-management structure as a proxy variable is a more desirable alternative to 
enhance the explanatory power of family effect on SMEs’ growth. 
The study also shed some light on future research. Firstly, we measure the family 
ownership based on one single item that is available in the Small Business Survey (2015) 
dataset. That is, whether the majority of the firms belong to members of the same family. 
Future research may benefit from using a multidimensional notion to the concept of family 
ownership, such as the percentage of family stake in the business. Relatedly, the growth 
measure in our analysis is based on subjective growth measures from a change-in-amount 
perspective, given that longitudinal and objective growth measures are not available in our 
data. Future research is encouraged to use more rigid and objective growth indicators utilizing 
longitudinal research design, such as profitability and return on equity. Alternatively, growth 
can also be measured by taking the process of development perspective, especially in the 
context of entrepreneurial owner-managers (Achtenhagen et al., 2010). Secondly, our main 
focus of the analysis is the family effect on the growth of SMEs, and the arguments are drawn 
upon small business managers’ beliefs and attitudes towards growth and the role of family 
orientation in shaping owner-managers’ beliefs. Future research is encouraged to examine the 
significance of these explanatory factors behind overly cautious growth behaviour pursued by 
SMEs, particularly financing capacity and the characteristics of decision-makers (e.g. beliefs 
and attitudes of owner managers towards growth). In addition to this, given the reliance of 
cross-sectional data in the current study, our analysis takes the perspective that the study is 
quite static by covering year of growth figures. In the near future, as new survey waves will 
be available, panel frameworks can be employed not only to capture the growth dynamics 
over time and thus make causal inferences but also, distinguish between survivors and non-
survivors. Last but not least, our conclusions are drawn in the UK small business sector, 
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however, family businesses vary considerably in risk taking that can affect growth behaviour. 
Differences can embed in various contextual factors, such as national culture (Perkins, 2000), 
historical experience (Masurel and Smit, 2000) and environmental dynamics within family 
firms (Simon, 1996). Future studies may investigate whether and/or examine how these 
macro- and micro-environmental factors can motivate or hamper small business growth 
behaviour.  
The study has important implications for managerial practice to family firms and on 
policies that improve the growth of SMEs. Though hiring individuals outside family members 
at management level may lead to agency problems associated with monitoring and 
enforcement, the results demonstrate that the involvement of professional managers in family 
firms leads to a significant difference in explaining growth behaviour in SMEs. Hence, the 
competence of managers and decision-makers also matters considerably in evaluating the 
efficient operation of the business and maximising economic growth in SMEs. As Barth et al. 
(2005: 125) suggest, “After all, professional managers are selected from a larger pool of 
talent”. Current governmental policy towards the development and growth of SMEs mainly 
focuses on enhancing their financing capability (Hamelin, 2013). The negative effect of 
ownership structure on SMEs suggests that such policy initiatives should also account for 
growth behaviour. In risk adverse oriented family businesses, where conservative growth 
behaviour is prevalent, easing the access to finance may not necessarily promote business 
expansion. In addition to this, one possible explanation for the family owned companies’ 
prudent growth strategy is the under-diversification of owner family’s wealth (Naldi et al., 
2007). In this case, using venture capital or employing specific insurance/buffer mechanism 
may reduce the exposure to systematic business risk and encourage owner-managers to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities sensibly and expand their business regime.   
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Table 1: Probit regression estimation results for growth in employment size: family 
ownership 
 
Dependent variables  
Panel A: Actual growth in 
employment size 
Panel B: Expected growth 
in employment size 
 
Coef. ME Coef. ME 
Ownership structure in 
SMEs 
  
  
 Family-owned business -0.123*** -0.043** -0.076* -0.029* 
 
0.040 0.014 0.040 0.015 
    
  
  
 Controls yes 
 
yes 
 Log likelihood -3,975.04 
 
-4,172.32 
 Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 577.97(27) 
 
398.13(27) 
 Obs. 6,605   6,345   
Notes: ME stands for marginal effects. 
Values below coefficients are standard errors. 
Estimation results for controlled variables are available upon request. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
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Table 2: Ordered probit estimation results for growth in turnover and sales: family ownership 
 
Panel A: Actual growth in turnover Coef. 
ME 
TA0 TA1 TA2 TA3 TA4 TA5 TA6 
Ownership structure in SMEs 
             Family-owned business -0.071* 0.027* -0.001** -0.002** -0.005* -0.003* -0.007* -0.009* 
 
0.037 0.014 0.0003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.005 
    
        Controls yes 
       Log likelihood -8,250.88 
       Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 484.52(27) 
       Obs. 6,011             
 Panel B: Expected growth in 
turnover 
Coef. 
ME 
TE0 TE1 TE2 TE3 TE4 TE5 TE6 
Ownership structure in SMEs 
             Family-owned business -0.065* 0.025* - -0.011* -0.005* -0.002* -0.007* -0.009* 
 
0.035 0.013 
 
0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 
    
        Controls yes 
       Log likelihood -9,365.19 
       Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 589.22(27) 
       Obs. 6,169             
 
Panel C: Expected growth in sales Coef. 
ME 
SE0 SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5 SE6 
Ownership structure in SMEs 
             Family-owned business -0.107** 0.029** 0.007*** - -0.012** -0.009** -0.001** -0.013** 
 
0.033 0.009 0.002 
 
0.004 0.003 0.0004 0.004 
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Controls yes 
       Log likelihood -10,009.48 
       Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 834.38(27) 
       Obs. 6,288               
Notes: ME stands for marginal effects. 
Growth rates: TA0= none or shrinkage; TA1 =1-4%; TA2=5-9%; TA3=10-14%; TA4=15-19%; TA5=20-29%; TA6=30%+. 
Growth rates: TE0= none; TE1 =1-4%; TE2=5-9%; TE3=10-14%; TE4=15-19%; TE5=20-29%; TE6=30%+. 
Growth rates: SE0=no; SE1=1-9%; SE2=10-24%; SE3=25-49%; SE4=50-74%; SE5=75-99%; SE6=100% or more. 
Values below coefficients are standard errors. 
Estimation results for controlled variables are available upon request. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
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Table 3: Probit regression estimation results for growth in employment size: owner-
management structure 
 
Dependent variables  
Panel A: Actual growth in 
employment size 
Panel B: Expected growth in 
employment size 
 
Coef. ME Coef. ME 
Management in family-
owned businesses 
          Owner managers only -0.148*** -0.051*** -0.079* -0.030* 
 
0.042 0.015 0.042 0.016 
      Professional managers in 
daily control of the business -0.031 -0.011 -0.042 -0.016 
 
0.059 0.021 0.06 0.023 
    
    Controls yes - yes - 
Log likelihood -3,378.55 - -3,946.60 - 
Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 555.17(28) - 373.68(28) - 
Obs. 6,246 
 
5,992 
 Notes: ME stands for marginal effects. 
Values below coefficients are standard errors. 
Estimation results for controlled variables are available upon request. 
***p<0.01; *p<0.10. 
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Table 4: Ordered probit estimation results for growth in turnover and sales: owner-management structure 
 
Panel A: Actual growth in turnover Coef. 
ME 
TA0 TA1 TA2 TA3 TA4 TA5 TA6 
Management in family-owned businesses 
           Owner managers only -0.069* 0.026* -0.0004* -0.002* -0.005* -0.003* -0.007* -0.009* 
 
0.038 0.014 0.0003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 
Professional managers in daily control of 
the business -0.050 0.019 -0.0003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 
 
0.055 0.02 0.0004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.007 
    
        Controls yes 
       Log likelihood -7,860.75 
       Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 454.73(28) 
       Obs. 5,680             
 
Panel B: Expected growth in turnover Coef. 
ME 
TE0 TE1 TE2 TE3 TE4 TE5 TE6 
Management in family-owned businesses 
           Owner managers only -0.068* 0.026* 0.0001 -0.001* -0.005* -0.002* -0.007* -0.009* 
 
0.037 0.014 0.0001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 
Professional managers in daily control of 
the business -0.031 0.012 0.00004 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
 
0.052 0.020 0.0001 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.007 
    
        Controls yes 
       Log likelihood -8,933.63 
       Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 545.22(28) 
       Obs. 5,833             
 Panel C: Expected growth in sales Coef. ME 
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SE0 SE1 SE2 SE3 SE4 SE5 SE6 
Management in family-owned businesses 
           Owner managers only -0.095** 0.024*** 0.007*** 0.00002 -0.011*** -0.008** -0.001** -0.011** 
 
0.035 0.009 0.003 0.0004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 
Professional managers in daily control of 
the business -0.095* 0.025* 0.007* 0.00002 -0.011* -0.008* -0.001* -0.011* 
 
0.050 0.013 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.006 
    
        Controls yes 
       Log likelihood -9,034.22 
       Chi
2
 (degrees of freedom) 916.12(30) 
       Obs. 5,697               
Notes: ME stands for marginal effects. 
Growth rates: TA0= none or shrinkage; TA1 =1-4%; TA2=5-9%; TA3=10-14%; TA4=15-19%; TA5=20-29%; TA6=30%+. 
Growth rates: TE0= none; TE1 =1-4%; TE2=5-9%; TE3=10-14%; TE4=15-19%; TE5=20-29%; TE6=30%+. 
Growth rates: SE0=no; SE1=1-9%; SE2=10-24%; SE3=25-49%; SE4=50-74%; SE5=75-99%; SE6=100% or more. 
Values below coefficients are standard errors. 
Estimation results for controlled variables are available upon request. 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistics (weighted estimates) 
 
Variables %  Mean S.D. Obs. 
     
Dependent variables 
   
 
Actual growth in employment size 
   
 
     More than currently  94.20 
  
15,337 
     Stay the same or less  5.80 
  Expected growth in employment 
size  
   
 
     More than currently  71.15 
  
14,636 
     Stay the same or less  28.85 
  Actual growth in turnover 
   
 
     None or shrinkage 74.49 
  
13,849 
     0-4% 1.80 
       5-9% 4.60 
       10-14% 5.70 
       15-19% 2.50 
       20-29% 5.20 
       30%+ 5.70 
  Expected growth in turnover 
   
 
     No growth 66.73 
  
14,072 
     0-4% 1.60 
       5-9% 4.40 
       10-14% 9.30 
       15-19% 2.50 
       20-29% 7.40 
       30%+ 8.10 
  Expected growth in sales 
   
 
     No growth 50.10 
  
14,431 
     1-9% 8.50 
       10-24% 18.60 
       25-49% 10.00 
       50-74% 5.60 
       75-99% 1.00 
       100% or more 6.80 
  
    
 
Independent Variables 
   
 
Ownership and governance 
structure 
   
 
     Non-family-owned businesses 24.04 
  
12,908 
     Family business with owner-
managers only  72.31 
       Family business with 3.64 
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professional managers 
    
 
Controlled variables  
   
 
Firm age 
   
 
     0-5yrs 15.25 
  
15,444 
     6-10yrs 18.32 
       11-20yrs 23.77 
       more than 20yrs 42.66 
  Industry 
   
 
     Primary industry  3.40 
  
15,502 
     Manufacturing 5.10 
       Construction 17.76 
       Wholesale/retail 9.69 
       Transport/storage 5.10 
       Accommodation/food 3.39 
       Information/communication 6.29 
       Financial/real estate 3.50 
       Professional/scientific 14.71 
       Administrative/support 8.22 
       Education 4.97 
       Health/social work 5.89 
       Arts/entertainment 4.98 
       Other service 6.00 
  Legal status 
   
 
     Sole Proprietorship 49.79 
  
15,502 
     Company 38.71 
       Partnership 7.76 
       Other 3.75 
  Presence of owner/partner in the business 
  
 
     No 4.15 
  
14,043 
     Yes 95.84 
  Geographical region  
   
 
     England 87.57 
  
15,502 
     Scotland 6.31 
       Wales 3.95 
       Northern Ireland 2.17 
  Firm size (number of employees)  
 
1.75 0.03 15,502 
Number of sites (log of number of sites in operation 
in the UK) 0.07 0.005 
15,414 
Firm capability  
 
3.75 0.01 7,714 
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